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I. INTRODUCTION

The law abhors a vacuum, and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) created a vacuum in providing a new route for
appellate review of decisions granting or denying class action
certification. This new section of the Rule, adopted in 1998,
gave the courts of appeals carte blanche to develop standards for
granting review in such cases. The development of the law in the
ensuing years shows that the drafters were ill-advised to leave
the courts to their own devices. Building on vague language in
the Advisory Committee Notes, the circuits have developed
*
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multi-part tests that are hard to understand, hard to apply, and
inconsistent with the limited role of the appellate courts. One of
those tests, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Chamberlan v. Ford
Motor Co.,' illustrates these difficulties and signals that it is time
to build more workable standards into Rule 23(f).
II. RULE 23(f)

GIVES SOLE DISCRETION TO THE COURTS OF
APPEALS

Some twenty years before the adoption of Rule 23(f), the
Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 2 had rejected
the notion that class action certification orders are appealable
final orders under 28 USC § 1291. This left parties seeking to
challenge class certification orders with few options: pursuing
the interlocutory appeal procedure available under 28 USC
§ 1292(b), applying for writs of mandamus, and followinf other
narrowly drawn routes for discretionary appellate review.
These options had proven unsatisfactory, so Rule 23(f)
opened a new path for review of class certification orders by
providing that
[a] court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class
certification under this rule if application is made to it
within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the court of appeals so orders.4

1. 402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
3. Kenneth S. Gould, FederalRule of Civil Procedure2369: InterlocutoryAppeals of
Class Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 309, 314-18 (1999)
(describing options formerly available to putative class representatives seeking leave to
appeal, including invocation of the "collateral final order" doctrine, appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292, and "stretching, if not perverting, the mandamus criteria").
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). Note, however, that
Rule 23(f) has been amended effective as of December 1, 2007, to state
Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to
appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 10 days after the order is entered. An
appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or
the court of appeals so orders.
S. Ct. of the U.S., Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 30, 2007)
(available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv07p.pdf) (accessed
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This new procedure removed some of the barriers to
interlocutory review imposed by §1292(b): It eliminates the
requirements that (1) the district court certify the ruling for
appeal, (2) the district court's order involve a controlling
question of law on which there is ground for difference of
opinion, and (3) the district court find that an immediate appeal
may materially advance the termination of the litigation.
Is the purpose of Rule 23(f) to encourage more appeals of
class certification orders? The Advisory Committee Notes
straddle the fence. They say that "many suits with class-action
allegations present familiar and almost routine issues that are no
more worthy of immediate appeal than many other interlocutory
rulings." 6 But they also say-in the next sentence-that various
"concerns" associated with class actions "justify expansion of
present opportunities to appeal."7
The Notes acknowledge that Rule 23(f) gives the courts of
appeals great latitude in accepting or denying petitions to appeal
class certification orders. They state that "[a]ppeal from an order
granting or denying class certification is permitted in the sole
discretion of the court of appeals," and also that "[t]he court of
appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to permit the
appeal." 8 But at the same time the Notes contemplate the
creation of a set of rules within which to exercise that discretion:
"The courts of appeals will develop standards for granting
review that reflect the changing areas of uncertainty in class
litigation." 9
Despite this broad grant of discretionary authority, the
Notes themselves describe two types of cases that may benefit
Oct. 12, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The Advisory
Committee Notes indicate that this amendment does not change the substance of the Rule,
for "[t]he style changes to the rules are intended to make no changes in substantive
meaning." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, Advisory Comm. N. (2007) (referring to the "Style Project," a
comprehensive rewrite of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended "to make them
more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the
rules") (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctl 106/ExcerptCV_Style.pdf)
(accessed Oct. 12, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), Advisory Comm. N. (1998) (referring to 1998 amendment)
(available at http://uscode.house.gov).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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from interlocutory review. First, where the named plaintiffs

individual claim is small, denial of class certification may mean
that plaintiff is unlikely to proceed to judgment in order to
obtain appellate review of the certification order; in that
circumstance, interlocutory appeal may be appropriate. Second,
where granting certification may force a defendant to settle
rather than incur the costs of defending on the merits to obtain
eventual review of the certification order, interlocutory appeal
can also be appropriate.
III.

THE COURTS OF APPEALS STEP INTO THE VOID

In 1999, the Seventh Circuit was the first to address
standards for accepting review of a class certification order. In
Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 10 citing the reference to
the courts' "unfettered discretion" in the Notes, the court
declined to
draw up a list that determines how the power under Rule
23(f) will be exercised. Neither a bright-line approach nor a
catalog of factors would serve well-especially at the
outset, when courts necessarily
must experiment with the
1
new class of appeals.

Instead of "inventing standards," Judge Easterbrook's opinion
outlined the three types of cases that might alP ropriately be
subject to interlocutory review under Rule 23(f). The first two
categories of cases draw on circumstances described in the
Notes, but the third does not.
First is the death-knell case, in which the named plaintiffs
individual claim is too small to justify the expense of litigation,
and the denial of class status can mean the end of the case. In
that circumstance, and if "plaintiff has a solid argument in
opposition to the district court's decision,"' 3 then appellate
review may be appropriate.
Second is what is often called the reverse death-knell
situation: a grant of class certification in a big-stakes case that

10.
11.
12.
13.

181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.).
Id.at 834.
Id.
Id. (echoing the first category of cases described in the Notes).
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can put undue pressure on a defendant to settle regardless of the

merits. According to Blair, review can be appropriate in14 that
circumstance if the district court's ruling is "questionable."'
Third, allowing an appeal may be appropriate to "facilitate
the development of the law."' 15 This means that appellate review
in a case raising a fundamental question of class action law may
be appropriate even if it cannot readily be shown "that the
district court's decision is shaky."' 6 Judge Easterbrook found
that the Blair case fit this third category, raising an "important"
issue regarding the treatment of multiple overlapping class
actions. He also noted that interlocutory appeal was appropriate
because the issue was likely to evade review after judgment. 17
While Blair signaled a preference for flexible analysis
rather than application of multi-part tests, its articulation of three
circumstances in which Rule 23(f) review could be appropriate
has since ossified and it is now characterized as setting out three
"standards" or "categories" for 23(f) review.' 8 Other circuits
have since adopted other multi-factor tests for accepting review
under Rule 23(f), 19 all of which are variations of that20articulated
in Blair, and all of which include the death-knell test.
14. Id. at 835 (expanding on the second description of cases found in the Notes while
pointing out that the appeals court is to "tak[e] into account the discretion the district judge
possesses in implementing Rule 23, and the correspondingly deferential standard of
appellate review," and cautioning that "[h]owever dramatic the effect of the grant or denial
of class status in undercutting the plaintiffs claim or inducing the defendant to capitulate, if
the ruling is impervious to revision there's no point to an interlocutory appeal").
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 838. The Seventh Circuit accepted subsequent cases for review on the same
ground: that deciding the issue would advance the development of the law of class actions.
See e.g. In re Household Int'l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Posner, J.); Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Easterbrook, J.) (noting that the case "presents some fundamental questions about the
management of consumer class actions").
18. Christopher A. Kitchen, Student Author, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action
Certification Decisions under FederalRule of Civil Procedure23Wj: A Proposalfora New
Guideline, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 231, 244-45 (introducing discussion of various
circuit tests, and discussing Blair itself).
19. Id. at 246-53. Judge Posner has frowned on such tests: "Multifactor tests are
notoriously difficult to apply, and the difficulties are not reduced by leaving the list of
factors open-ended. More to my present point, multifactor tests invite tedious, meandering
opinions." Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1421, 1439 (1995).
20. See generally Carey M. Erhard, Student Author, A Discussion of the Interlocutory
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CHAMBERLAN GUIDELINES

In 2005 the Ninth Circuit adopted its own set of guidelines
for consideration of Rule 23(f) petitions.
Review of class certification decisions will be most
appropriate when:
(1) there is a death-knell situation for either the plaintiff or
defendant that is independent of the merits of the
underlying claims, coupled with a class certification
decision by the district court that is questionable;
(2) the certification decision presents an unsettled and
fundamental issue of law relating to class actions,
important both to the specific litigation and generally, that
is likely to evade end-of-the-case review; or
(3) the district court's class certification decision is
manifestly erroneous.21
The problem with these guidelines-and with the
comparable tests adopted by other circuits-is that they tell
litigants little if anything about the types of cases that are likely
to receive interlocutory review. And as the following discussion
will show, two of the factors advance the idea that the court of
appeals must predict whether the class certification will result in
early settlement or dismissal of the case, effectively resurrecting
doctrine that the Supreme Court rejected in
the death-knell
22
Livesay.
A. Chamberlan Guideline 1: "DeathKnell"

1. The Guideline's Balancing Test
The first Chamberlan guideline states that review may be
appropriate if the death-knell test points in the direction of
premature termination of the litigation, and if the district court's
Review of Class Certification Orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(), 51
Drake L. Rev. 151 (2002).
21. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959 (noting in addition that this set of guidelines is
modeled most closely on the standards adopted by the D.C. Circuit in In re Lorazepam &
ClorazepateAntitrustLitig.,289 F.3d 98, 99-100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
22. See infra pp. 196-97.
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opinion is "questionable." This death-knell factor--drawn from
the Notes to Rule 23(f)-weighs the cost of litigation against
either the value of the named plaintiffs claim (when
certification is denied) 23or the pressure to settle (when
certification is granted). This calculation seeks to avoid a
premature termination of the case-through voluntary dismissal
or settlement-following an erroneous ruling on class
certification.
What has never been made clear is the evidence the court
should or could consider in balancing the cost of litigation
against the risk of early termination. The record in the district
court on class certification is unlikely to address the projected
cost of future litigation, which means that the court of appeals
may have no basis on which to reach a conclusion about costs
before conducting the balancing test recommended by this
guideline. 24 Similarly, the court is unlikely to find evidence in
the record establishing the extent to which (1) a defendant will
be pressured to settle following certification of a class, or (2) a
plaintiff will be forced to drop his or her claim if certification is
denied. The court can in consequence only speculate about
whether the case would be terminated early on either basis.
Also unclear is the point at which to begin tallying the cost
of litigation in order to compare it to either the value of the
claim or the pressure to settle. Is it appropriate to consider the
cost from the outset of the case, or only the cost from the date on
which the district court issued its order on class certification?
The choice is particularly important when deciding whether
interlocutory appeal should be allowed following a denial of
class certification. If sufficient discovery has occurred before the
certification motion so that plaintiff would incur relatively little
in additional fees when proceeding to trial, should interlocutory
review be denied? Or is the cost of the litigation from the outset
the relevant consideration? And if the court is to consider the
entire cost of litigation, won't the plaintiffs claim in virtually
every case be "worth far less than the cost of litigation," making
it appropriate to review nearly every order denying
23. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 957.
24. One of the factors relevant to certifying a class action is whether "a class action is
superior to other available methods" of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This
superiority test may require the district court to inquire into the cost of litigation.
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certification? 25 The small size of plaintiff's claim relative to the

cost of the litigation is, after all, the very reason that most claims
are pursued as class actions.
2. The Livesay Critique
The Supreme Court's decision in Livesay26 highlights the
practical difficulty inherent in asking the court of appeals to
predict whether a certification decision will result in premature
termination of the litigation. Livesay arose from a conflict in the
circuits about the proper route for appellate review of orders
denying class certification. Several circuits, including the Eighth
(from which Livesay arose), had developed the rule that a denial
of class certification could be reviewable as a final judgment
under 28 USC § 1291 if it was likely to sound the death knell.
As the Court put it, these circuits took the position that "without
the incentive of a possible group recovery the individual
plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his
lawsuit to a final judgment and then seek appellate review of an
adverse class determination." 27 The Court then rejected the use
of the death-knell analysis as a proxy for finality, and held that
"orders relating to class certification are not independently
28
appealable under § 1291 prior to judgment.,
The Livesay Court was critical of the death-knell rule
because it amounted to an "arbitrary measure of finality" that
did not take into account many factors that might play into a
plaintiffs decision about whether to proceed in the face of an
adverse certification ruling. 29 And to the extent that a court of

appeals might seek to conduct a thorough analysis of the many
factors relevant to a death-knell determination, that analysis
would require plaintiff to build a record in the trial court
25. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 957 (recognizing that the small size of a plaintiff's claim
relative to the cost of the litigation is the very reason that most claims are pursued as class
actions).
26. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
27. Id. at 469-70.
28. Id. at 470.
29. id. at 472. The Court listed some of those other factors: "the plaintiff's resources;
the size of his claim and his subjective willingness to finance prosecution of the claim; the
probable cost of the litigation and the possibility of joining others who will share that cost;
and the prospect of prevailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class
certification." Id. at 471 n. 15.
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regarding such issues as the size of his30 or her own claim and
those of the class members in aggregate.
The circuits that applied the death-knell rule had held that if
the record was inadequate to enable the appeals court to assess
the risk of premature termination, then remand was necessary
for development of the facts. 31 The Court called such effort a
"potential waste of judicial resources" and noted that its
incremental benefit in identifying orders that would result in
premature resolution was outweighed 32by the burden that it
placed on the judicial system as a whole.
It is curious, then, that the analysis rejected years ago by
the Livesay Court as arbitrary and burdensome has emerged as a
central feature of Rule 23(f)'s guidelines for granting appellate
review. Significantly, unlike the courts of appeals that developed
a death-knell rule before Livesay, courts applying Rule 23(f)
have not required district courts to develop factual records on
whether the grant or denial of certification would result in
premature termination of the litigation. This means that courts
considering Rule 23(f) review today have even less factual basis
for their death-knell analysis than did the courts that used the
test before it was criticized in Livesay.
B. Chamberlan Guideline2: "Likely to Evade
End-of-the-Case Review"
The second Chamberlan guideline states that review can be
appropriate when the decision presents an "unsettled and
fundamental issue of law" that is "likely to evade end-of-thecase review." 33 This guideline similarly provides little assistance

30. Id. at 473 and n. 20 (citing Hooley v. Red Carpet Corp., 549 F.2d 643 (9th Cir.
1977), and Ott v. Speedwriting Pub. Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 402 F.3d at 959. This "likely to evade review" standard originated with the First
Circuit's decision in Waste ManagementHoldings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288 (1st Cir.
2000), as a refinement of the third Blair category, which identified as appropriate for
review cases involving fundamental issues of class action law. See id. at 293-94 (citing
Blair and describing it as "cogently reasoned," noting that a "creative lawyer" can argue
that any issue of class action law is fundamental, and determining that it is therefore
necessary to review a fundamental issue only if it is "likely to escape effective review if
left hanging until the end of the case").
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to litigants. In fact, it seems to be substantially the same as the
death-knell test: If the claim is likely to be dismissed or settled
in the event that no appeal is allowed, then interlocutory review
may be appropriate.
A certification decision is likely to evade review only if
there is a settlement 34 or voluntary dismissal short of trial. In
nearly every other circumstance, a certification order will not
evade review. It will in most situations be appealable when the
litigation is concluded, for a certification decision is appealable
as a matter of right after the case is litigated to judgment. 35 In
fact, a plaintiff who fails to obtain certification may appeal that
decision following entry of judgment even if the case is mooted
by an "involuntary" resolution caused by the defendant's
payment into the court of all the damages claimed by the
plaintiff. 36 In that circumstance, the plaintiff's individual claim
is extinguished but he or she is nonetheless entitled to appeal the
denial of class certification. 37 This means that, with limited
exceptions, 38 only a voluntary dismissal or settlement short of
trial will prevent end-of-case review of a certification decision.
Distilled to their essence, then, the first two guidelines
show a preference for interlocutory review if a case is likely to
be dismissed or settled following the determination on class
certification. They differ only in that they temper the availability

34. A plaintiff is not entitled, after voluntarily settling his claim and dismissing the case
with prejudice, to appeal the denial of class certification. Seidman v. Beverly Hills, 785
F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[a] plaintiff may not appeal a voluntary
dismissal because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him," and that "an
appealable final judgment must still be adverse to the plaintiff [and] cannot be the product
of a voluntary stipulation").
35. UnitedAirlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 393 (1977).
36. Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332-33 (1980); see also
Pastor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 F.3d 1042, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 2007)
(indicating that denial of class certification is appealable as a matter of right after plaintiff
accepted a "modest offer of judgment ...which terminated the case"; court of appeals had
previously refused to accept interlocutory review under Rule 23(0)).
37. Id. (pointing out that the plaintiff retained the right to appeal the denial of class
certification so long as he "retained an economic interest in class certification").
38. Blair itself illustrates an exception, according to the Seventh Circuit. There the
issue was whether a settlement in one class action bound the plaintiffs in a second class
action against the same defendant on the same grounds. The court stated that the issue
before it concerned "the relation among (potentially inconsistent) judgments," not just "the
management of pending litigation," and because that issue might evade review at the end of
the case, interlocutory appeal was appropriate. 181 F.3d at 837-38 (italics in original).
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of interlocutory review by requiring that the district court ruling
be "questionable" on the one hand or raise "unsettled and
fundamental issues" on the other. As shown above, the courts of
appeal are not well positioned to predict whether a litigant is
likely either to dismiss a claim or to agree to a disadvantageous
settlement if review is denied.39 In that respect, the first two
guidelines are difficult to apply, and in any event, they conflict
with the Supreme
40 Court's view of the appropriate role of the
appellate courts.
C. Chamberlan Guideline 3: "Manifestly Erroneous"
The Ninth Circuit's third guideline abandons the inquiry
into the potential effect of the district court's certification
decision, and asks only whether it was "manifestly erroneous. 4 1
What is unclear is how, if at all, this standard differs from the
instruction in the first Chamberlan guideline advising appellants
that to obtain review they must show that the District Court's
decision was "questionable. 42 How does a court distinguish
between "manifestly erroneous" legal rulings and "questionable"
legal rulings? 43 Evidently the two standards are not the same,
39. The Eleventh Circuit's approach to review under Rule 23(f) is noteworthy because
it explicitly requires the appellate courts to step outside their limited role and inquire into
issues unlikely to appear in the district court's record. According to Prado-Steiman v.
Bush, 221 F.3d 1266 (1 1th Cir. 2000), the appeals court should look at five "guideposts,"
which include the status of discovery, whether settlement negotiations are underway, and
whether there is an impending change in financial status of one of the parties, such as
bankruptcy. Id. at 1276. These matters typically will not appear in the record below, and it
is not the role of the federal courts of appeals to develop a record on such issues.
40. See e.g. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 476 (pointing out that "allowing appeals as of right
from nonfinal orders that turn on the facts of a particular case thrusts appellate courts
indiscriminately into the trial process and thus defeats one vital purpose of the finaljudgment rule-'that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective
courts.... This goal, in the absence of most compelling reasons to the contrary, is very
much worth preserving"') (footnote and citation omitted).
41. This standard is already familiar to appellate courts, which commonly use it in
reviewing objections relating to admissibility of evidence: A trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence is affirmed unless manifestly erroneous. See e.g. Hemmings v.
Tidyman's, Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9thCir. 2002),cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110(2003).
42. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d 959 (setting out list of standards).
43. Compare this with the Ninth Circuit factors for accepting review by writ of
mandamus, which include the requirement that the district court's decision be "clearly
erroneous as a matter of law." Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir.
1977).
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because only "questionable" rulings must be accompanied by a

"death knell" effect on the litigation in order to merit review.
But, again, the practitioner seeking to apply these standards has
received no guidance from the Ninth Circuit on the shades of
difference between them.
V. REVIEW OF CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDERS: A POTENTIAL

NEW PATH

The experiment launched under Rule 23(f) left to the courts
of appeals the task of developing standards for granting review
of class certification orders. After ten years of experience, the
courts have not strayed from the limited criteria, including the
death-knell test, suggested in the Advisory Committee Notes.
This leaves the appellate courts of today no better suited to
apply that particular test than they were when the Supreme
Court criticized it in Livesay.
It is time to revise Rule 23(f) so that it includes explicit
criteria for accepting interlocutory review. Those criteria should
exclude the death-knell test as unsuitable for application by
appellate courts. And the other tests that the courts of appeals
have

identified-including

a

"questionable"

ruling,

a

"manifestly erroneous" ruling, or one "raising unsettled and
fundamental issues"-should be articulated in a revised Rule
23(f) that adds the following:
Appeal will be allowed if the petitioner makes a substantial

showing that the district court's certification order (1)
contains an error of law, or (2) raises a novel legal question
affecting the development of the law of class actions and
merits immediate resolution.
This short and clear statement of the governing principles would
help the courts of appeals achieve consistency in applying the
Rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
As currently applied, Rule 23(f) requires the courts of

appeals to predict the future of particular cases despite having
access in each to little or no factual record on which to base the
prediction. They must ask whether a refusal to accept
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interlocutory review will cause premature termination of the

litigation through settlement or dismissal, and they must do so
even though the difficulties with that exercise were evident to
the Supreme Court decades ago. Rule 23(f) should therefore be
amended to end the murky predictions necessitated by the deathknell and likely-to-evade-review tests. Instead, the courts of
appeals should be directed-in language like that set out
above-to determine whether a proposed interlocutory appeal
raises an error of law or a legal issue that merits immediate
review.

